Webof MMA, it potentially has better egalitarian guarantee than EF1 allocations. By definition, an MMA1 allocationA guarantees that for each agent i and her favorite item e ∈A−i (suppose k), vi (Ai)is at least as large as the worst bundle in any n−1 -partition of A−i \{e}. However, if is EF1, it means there exists an (n −1)- Webis said to be EF1 if every agent prefers their own bundle over the bundle of any other agent after removing at most one good from the other agent’s bundle. When the valuations of …
Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles
Web(in addition to ex-ante EF), but ex-post EF1 can be recovered through a simple modi cation. 1.2 Related Work A large body of work in computer science and economics has focused on nding exactly ex-ante fair randomized allocations as well as approximately fair deterministic allocations, and we cite those works as appropriate throughout the paper. Web4 de nov. de 2024 · EF1 allocations always exist and can be found in polynomial time even for general valuations [2, 14, 25]. Finding MUW allocations is also polynomial-time … ippsfftfwd_ctoc_64fc
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents
Web18 de out. de 2024 · The notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is considered, and it is shown that for three agents the authors can always compute a 5-approximation of EFX allocation in polynomial time. 6 Highly Influenced PDF View 4 excerpts, cites background Weighted EF1 Allocations for Indivisible Chores Xiaowei Wu, Cong Zhang, Shengwei … Web18 de mai. de 2024 · There exists a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute an EF1+PO allocation, and a non-constructive proof of existence of allocations that are both EF1 and fractionally Pareto-optimal (fPO). We present a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute an EF1+fPO allocation, thereby improving the earlier results. Web29 de mar. de 2024 · However, in any EF1 allocation the last two goods cannot both be given to agent 2. Hence the social welfare of an EF1 allocation is at most (1/3 − 2 𝜖) + (1/3 + 𝜖) + 1/2 = 7/6 − 𝜖. Taking \epsilon \rightarrow 0, we find that the price of EF1 is at least \frac {4/3} {7/6} = 8/7. We now turn to the upper bound. ippsec writeups